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WYASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
DETERMINATION OF TIME OF TAKING OF
AVIGATION EASEMENT
Plaintiffs, owners of property lying under the flight path of planes
using the airport owned and operated by defendant,' brought inverse
condemnation2 actions alleging defendant had acquired an avigation
easement. Having concluded that the date of the taking was, as a mat-
ter of law, when the first regularly scheduled use of the runways in
question began, the trial court dismissed the complaints because plain-
tiffs acquired their properties after that date. On appeal, a unanimous
court reversed and remanded. Held: The taking of an avigation ease-
ment occurs, not when the first regularly scheduled commercial use of
an airport commences, but when low flights become continuing and
frequent over the affected servient lands. Anderson v. Port of Seattle,
66 Wash. Dec. 2d 443, 403 P.2d 368 (1965).
Although most courts recognize the futility of applying dated theor-
ies of trespass or nuisance to airport noise problems,3 they generally
attempt to adjust to avigation easement problems by resort to some
unfortunate hybridization of these traditional common law concepts.4
In the landmark case, Martin v. Port of Seattle,' the Washington
Supreme Court recognized the right to recover in inverse condem-
nation in such situations as being derived from the state constitution. 6
'Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), established that
the Port of Seattle, a municipal corporation, was the proper defendant in an action
in inverse condemnation, despite the fact that the Port does not actually own or
operate aircraft. The Port was held liable on the theory that it could have exercised
eminent domain and failed to do so adequately. Holding the owner-operator liable
is theoretically and practically superior to holding numerous and changing airlines
who use the airports. See Note, 65 COLUm. L. Rv. 1428, 1438-39 (1966). For similar
holdings, see Matson v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 389, 171 F .Supp. 283 (1959) ; Thorn-
burg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). See also Comment,
39 WASH. L. Rav. 920, 928-32 (1965).
"Inverse condemnation" is an eminent domain proceeding in which the property
owner brings suit to compel condemnation of his property, in whole or in part, and
to recover the value of the private land which has been appropriated to public use,
but which has not been fully condemned. See Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d
309, 310 n.1, 391 P.2d 540, 542 n.1 (1964).
'See generally Note, Airport Noise: Problem in Tort Law & Federalism, 74 HAgv.
L. Rav. 1580 (1961) ; Note, 47 MINN. L. Rxv. 889 (1963).
'See, e.g., City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958)(trespass) ; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942) (nuisance);
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E2d 575 (1942) (trespass);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (nuisance).
564 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), 39 WASH.
L. Rav. 398 (1964). For an extended discussion, see Comment, 39 WASH. L. Ray.
920 (1965).
'WAsH. CoNsT., art. 1, § 16 provides: "No private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been
made...."
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The right exists whenever there is a decline in market value due to
impaired use and enjoyment of the land resulting from the taking of
an avigation easement.
Since the parties in the principal case stipulated the existence-of the
easement, the only question raised was the time of the taking. The
court grounded its holding upon Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,7 which
held that "continuing and frequent low flights" over appellant's land
amounted to the taking of an air easement above the land. Ackerman
also established the measure of damages applied in the principal case.
This was stated as "the difference between the value of [the] property
before the airport was extensively used and the value thereafter, plus
interest from that date."
8
It can be argued that persons purchasing land adjacent to a runway
after the start of commercial flight operations should be said to have
assumed the risk that conditions will deteriorate. 9 Such an approach
is cogent only if the time of the taking is assumed to be when the first
commercial airplane flew over a particular plaintiff's property with
the intent on the part of defendant to continue such flights.1" This was
essentially the view of the lower court in the principal case.'1 While
this simplistic approach may demand fewer intellectual machinations
by judges and attorneys, its factual unsoundness is demonstrated by
the evidence in the principal case. Plaintiffs made it quite clear that
when flight operations commenced in 1947 there was insufficient inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of their lands to precipitate decline
in market value.'2 Since Martin established decline in market value as
the primary basis for recovery in an inverse condemnation action, it
follows that the flight of a single commercial aircraft with the requisite
intent' should not be sufficient to constitute a taking. The "first
flight" analysis would virtually immunize the airport from liability to
all who became purchasers after the date of the first commercial flight
'55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
Id. at 413, 348 P.2d at 672.
" Comment, 47 MiNN. L. REv. 889, 898 (1963). Consider PRossER, TORTS § 92
(3d ed. 1964), concerning the plaintiff who has "come to the nuisance."
"'The "first plane" approach was taken in Highland Park v. United States, 150
Ct. Cl. 389, 161 F. Supp. 597, 600 (1958), which held that the taking was complete
and the prescriptive period began to run "...when the first jet bomber flew over
plaintiff's property, with the intent on the part of the defendant to continue to fly
them over it at will."
" Brief for Appellants, pp. 30-31.
" Brief for Appellants, p. 25. Indicative that plaintiffs did not think that flights
were "frequent and continuous" in 1947 is that there were 341 flights in 1947, and
90,120 in 1958. They contended that the taking occurred during 1952-1953.
" See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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-even though there was in fact no such interference as would have
given the purchaser the benefit of reduced purchase price. Such a
result could be a trap for the unwary who did not include in the con-
tract of sale an assignment of their grantor's pre-existing cause of
action, if any.
14
The desirability of the result in the principal case lies ultimately in
policy considerations. Implicit in the holding is the idea that, since
the airport exists for the good of the community, the community and
not the individual landowners should bear the cost of its operation."
The court clearly considers the public interest in air travel, commercial
terminals, and civic growth to be subordinate to the public interest in
the sanctity of private property. In addition, since a contrary result
could have the effect of freezing land ownership due to unreasonable
investment risks, greater freedom of alienability is promoted.
Although the court appears to have reached an equitable result-
indeed, the only result possible given the language of Ackerman cou-
pled with the progressive approach demonstrated in Martin-the
decision is conspicuous in its brevity and silence. It seems obvious that
the lower court had trouble in determining what constituted "continu-
ing and frequent" low flights within the meaning of Ackerman; it
seems equally obvious that the appellate court might have reformulated
the Ackerman language. On the other hand, resort to such concepts as
"'Although there is no direct Washington holding on the point, it appears that
a grantor's cause of action in inverse condemnation is assignable. In Silverstone v.
Ham, 66 Wash. 440, 120 Pac. 109 (1912), it was stated that the right to compensation
for a taking in eminent domain vests in the owner of the land at the time of the
taking, and is assignable. A cause of action for damage to real property has long
been regarded as assignable. Jordan v. Welch, 61 Wash. 569, 112 Pac. 656 (1911).
Indicative of the liberality of the Washington court vis-a-vis assignability of a
cause of action is Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wn. 2d 108, 291 P.2d 657 (1955), holding
that a cause of action for damages to personal property is assignable. In Cooper,
the court stated the test of assignability as being whether the cause of action would
survive to the personal representative of the assignor under common law or statute.
Since Cooper, the survival statute has been considerably broadened. WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 4.20.046 (1965) provides:
All causes of action by a person ... against another person. .. shall survive to the
personal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of
the latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise, and whether or
not such actions would have survived at the common law or prior to the date of
eiactment of this section ... [Emphasis added.]
Clearly, it appears that even if the right to assign a cause of action in inverse
condemnation did not exist prior to 1961, which seems contrary to the above cases,
the right does exist under literal reading, at least, of WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.20.046
(1965).
' This attitude was made clear in Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 319,
391 P.2d 540, 547 (1964) (dictum), where the court said: "When the land of an
individual is diminished in value for the public benefit, then justice, and the con-
stitution, require that the public pay."
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"direct and immediate"' 6 or "substantial"' 7 would not solve jury
instruction problems of a trial court. Thus, it is probably fortunate
that the court retained its earlier language, thereby relying upon future
cases to expand the legal points involved. Perhaps the most realistic
approach at this early state of the law of avigation easements was
taken in Thornburg v. Port of Portland," where the Oregon court said:
In submitting to a jury a case such as we have before us, the trial court
is confronted with the need to verbalize rules as abstract as any to be
found in the law, but.., the ingenuity of trial judges in formulating
meaningful instructions to juries is usually equal to the task.' 9
While this admittedly begs the question of what should go into a
proper jury instruction, it has the advantage of allowing time and dif-
ferent fact situations to clarify the test for finding a taking.
The Washington court seems clearly correct in selecting one of the
last in a series of possible value-affecting events (which would appear
to include, sequentially, the announcement of airport plans, completion
of airport, first commercial flight, continuing and frequent low flights,
et cetera) as fixing the critical time of accrual of a cause of action. The
continuing and frequent low flight test seems considerably narrower
than the simple decline-in-market-value formula and appears to be the
appropriate rule. Under this rule, before collecting, a landowner may
have to wait for a few years beyond the commencement of an actual
decline in neighborhood land values, but there seem to be clear counter-
vailing benefits."0 In short, the best approach to value-affecting alter-
natives seems to be to pick an event which is both sufficiently specific,
" See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946), where the Court
spoke in terms of direct and immediate interference as a measure of taking.
17 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 695, 162 F. Supp. 769 (1958);
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), which involved the
concept of substantiality of interference.
"233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), 41 TEXAs L. Rav. 827 (1963).
"376 P.2d at 110.
-The benefits appear to be the following: (1) If the original owner continues to
hold, he does eventually collect. (2) If he sells before low flights become continuing
and frequent, and if land values have already dropped, he may increase the price he
would otherwise get by passing the clear prospect of a cause of action on to his
grantee. See note 14 supra. (3) If the price received reflects the full market value
decline with regard to the cause of action, so long as the rule is clearly established,
the grantor can rely on the benefits of a reservation in the contract of sale of rights
to part or all of the prospective award. (4) On the other hand, if land values have
not yet dropped, fixing the accrual of the cause of action at a relatively late event
minimizes the possibility that a grantor will sell without having exercised an
already accrued right, thereby depriving the grantee redress when the land value
actually drops. (5) Moreover, if the decline in value is spaced over a series of events,
picking a late event minimizes conceptual difficulties in giving an award theoret-
ically attuned to the impact of the fully-operating airport upon land values when, in
fact, there is little interference with use and enjoyment.
196
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so that in the future landowners can frame their sale arrangements in
deliberate reliance on it, and as late as possible in the chain of value-
affecting events, so that the unwary will not find themselves without
redress or with only partial redress for an actual decline in value.
The Washington cases continue to leave open the question whether
a cause of action accrues whenever there is a major change in the
quality of user of the prescriptive easement, as by a change from
propeller driven aircraft to jets or from jets to rockets or such
mammoths as supersonic transports. As has been pointed out,2 ' Martin
opened the door to an affirmative answer in such cases. Since the court
in the principal case did not abrogate any of its earlier pronounce-
ments, the answer seems still to be an affirmative one. Although this
may evoke in terrorem responses, the result is in keeping with the
policy, integral to the result in the principal case, that the public pay
for what it takes.
ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEREST IN INTESTATE
DECEDENTS' ESTATE
Plaintiff, surviving member of a thirteen year meretricious relation-
ship with defendant's decedent, brought an action to establish a half-
interest in the estate, consisting of both real and personal property.
She stated alternative theories of recovery-including resulting trust,
partnership, joint venture, and a pooling agreement-all but the first
being contractually based. Although most of the assets of the estate
were accumulated during their cohabitation, plaintiff was unable to
prove by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence the existence of any
significant monetary investment from her personal funds. The evi-
dence indicated that her contribution to the accumulated assets con-
sisted primarily of labor, including assisting her partner, a masonry
contractor, in building, finishing, and landscaping their home, and in
some of his commercial ventures. The trial court, in denying recovery,
found that no specific agreement existed, and that it was impossible
to trace the funds used to purchase the property. On appeal, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court affirmed, over vigorous dissents, in a 5-4 deci-
sion. Held: When title to property acquired during a meretricious
relationship is held by a decedent, the survivor who seeks to establish
a half-interest in the property, but is unable to demonstrate a con-
tractual arrangement, will be unable to recover the value of services
Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box?,
39 WASH. L. REv. 920, 938 (1965).
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